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LAW SUMMARY 
Fast-Track Sentencing: A Potential Solution 
to the Divisive Discretion  
ELIZABETH WEBER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are currently an estimated eleven million illegal immigrants in the 
United States,1 and certain immigrant-dense regions have buckled under the 
weight of illegal aliens.2  Fast-track programs, first established by proactive 
federal prosecutors and later sanctioned by Congress, were designed to more 
efficiently prosecute aliens who had illegally reentered the country.3  These 
programs expedited prosecution by guaranteeing a defendant a lighter sen-
tence in exchange for pleading guilty and forgoing certain procedural formali-
ties.4 
However, the Department of Justice (DOJ) did not authorize fast-track 
programs in all federal districts, leaving defendants in non-fast-track districts 
complaining of unequal treatment between themselves and similarly situated 
defendants who could receive shorter prison terms.5  Defendants in non-fast-
track districts asserted the unequal treatment warranted lower sentences for 
themselves, and a split developed among the federal circuit courts of appeals 
as to whether a district court in a non-fast-track district could grant a lower 
sentence based on the sentencing disparity.6  A recent change in the DOJ’s 
policy regarding authorization of fast-track programs offers a quick-fix to this 
problem: let every defendant charged with a certain crime, regardless of loca-
tion, be eligible for a lighter, fast-track sentence.7   
  
 * B.S., University of Missouri, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2013; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2012-13.  
 1. Editorial, GOP Candidates’ Immigration Fantasies, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/01/opinion/la-ed-immigration-20120201. 
 2. See KEVIN F. MCCARTHY & GEORGES VERNEZ, IMMIGRATION IN A CHANGING 
ECONOMY:  CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE (1997) (describing immigrant’s fiscal burden 
on the state of California); see also infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (explain-
ing the impact of illegal immigrants on the criminal system). 
 3. See infra Part II.C.  Fast-track programs are also commonly known as “early 
disposition programs.”  See United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704, 706-08, 
710 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 4. See infra Part II.C. 
 5. See infra Part II.D. 
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
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This Summary examines the current federal sentencing regime, the es-
tablishment of fast-track programs, and the resulting circuit split regarding 
whether a judge can grant a defendant a more lenient sentence based on the 
lack of availability of a fast-track option in that jurisdiction.8  Further, it dis-
cusses more recent developments regarding the circuit split and how the new 
DOJ policy purports to resolve the issue.9  Finally, this Summary argues that 
while this change does solve the sentencing disparity problem, it conflicts 
with the congressional policy underlying the official sanction of fast-track 
programs.10  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The starting point in determining any particular defendant’s prison sen-
tence is the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), which suggest a 
sentencing range based on the particular crime and the defendant’s criminal 
history.11  The lower sentences offered to fast-track defendants depart from 
the Guidelines; the departure is granted by prosecutors, rather than by the 
sentencing judges, and is only available to defendants in authorized jurisdic-
tions.12  Some background on the current federal sentencing scheme is helpful 
to appreciating the potential disparity problem created by these programs.  
Thus, this Part explains what is perhaps this country’s most significant federal 
sentencing legislation, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,13 and describes 
the Supreme Court of the United States’ adverse reaction to the new system.14  
It then recounts the creation of fast-track programs, from their inception in 
the Offices of the United States Attorneys to Congress’s authorization of the 
programs several years later.  After describing the circuit split on whether 
district judges may grant lighter sentences based on this sentence disparity,15 
this Part considers an analogous circuit split and how it was resolved.16 
A.  Federal Sentencing Reform 
Prior to 1984, federal judges, following a “medical” model of sentenc-
ing,17 possessed wide sentencing discretion limited only by statutory maxi-
  
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part II.C. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006); see also infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.D. 
 16. See infra Part II.E. 
 17. Founded on the belief that “criminal deviance could be treated like any other 
disorder,” the “medical” model aimed to individualize sentences “according to the 
symptoms and pathology of the offender” much like medical treatments are formu-
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mums and minimums.18  The advent of the parole system coupled with this 
broad judicial discretion made the federal sentencing system an uncertain 
one.19  While a court’s sentence would effectively determine the minimum or 
maximum sentence for a prisoner, the parole board had authority to determine 
the actual release date.20  The uncertainty and arbitrariness of sentencing 
caused by this indeterminate system sparked a great deal of criticism, eventu-
ally leading to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the SRA).21 
Congress sought to accomplish two primary goals with the SRA: (1) 
“honesty in sentencing,” and (2) the elimination of unwarranted sentencing 
disparity.22  The goal of “honesty” was to ensure that “the sentence imposed 
by the judge [would] be the sentence actually served.”23  To achieve this, 
Congress abolished the parole system for federal prisoners.24  To remedy the 
problem of inconsistency in sentences,25 Congress created the United States 
  
lated for a specific patient.  Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1318, 1321 (2005). 
 18. Id. at 1322; Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: 
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 223, 225 (1993).  
 19. Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 226-27.  Proponents of the parole system 
believed that a parole official’s power to determine a prisoner’s release date would be 
a powerful incentive to the prisoner to rehabilitate himself.  Id. at 227. 
 20. Id. at 226-27. 
 21. Tom McKay, Note, Judicial Discretion to Consider Sentencing Disparities 
Created by Fast-Track Programs: Resolving the Post-Kimbrough Circuit Split, 48 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (2011).  One federal judge was especially critical of 
the sentencing power entrusted to him, calling it “terrifying and intolerable for a soci-
ety that professes devotion to the rule of law.”  Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 228 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 22. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises upon which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).  These goals represent 
the unusual bipartisan coalition behind the legislation, with liberals concerned about 
the lack of equality from wide judicial discretion and conservatives upset with “per-
ceived undue leniency in sentencing.”  James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate 
Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 271-72 (1999). 
 23. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 56 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3239.  According to Congress, “[p]risoners’ morale [would] probably improve when 
the uncertainties about release dates are removed,” and “[p]ublic respect for the law 
[would] grow when the public knows that the judicially-imposed sentence announced 
in a particular case represents the real sentence.”  Id.  However, since the SRA still 
allows for credit towards the sentence for good behavior, the sentence imposed by a 
judge is still not necessarily the sentence served.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2006). 
 24. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 56. 
 25. For an example of the disparity criticized by Congress, the average national 
sentence for a federal bank robbery offense was eleven years in 1974, yet, the average 
in a federal district in Illinois was only half of that.  Id. at 41.  
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Sentencing Commission (the Commission) to establish federal sentencing 
policies.26 
As originally enacted, the SRA mandated, with a few exceptions, that a 
defendant’s sentence fall within a range determined by the Sentencing Table 
prescribed by the Commission’s Guidelines.27  The Commission created the 
table using empirical data regarding past sentencing practices.28  To calculate 
an appropriate Guidelines sentence, a sentencing judge would consult the 
Commission’s Sentencing Table based upon an “offense level”29 and the de-
fendant’s “criminal history category.”30  Thus, instead of giving judges free 
rein to sentence defendants based on their own individualized assessments of 
each case, the Guidelines required sentences within a predetermined range 
based on data of past sentencing practices.31 
B.  Judicial Reaction to the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines 
As intended, the SRA severely limited judicial discretion in sentencing 
for nearly two decades.32  However, the Guidelines became advisory in 2005 
after the Supreme Court of the United States struck down their mandatory 
aspect as unconstitutional in United States v. Booker.33  In Booker, the defen-
dant’s conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine yielded a 
maximum Guidelines sentence of 262 months.34  At the sentencing hearing, 
  
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 991.  
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (stating that “the court shall impose a sentence of the 
kind, and within the range” mandated by statute (emphasis added)), invalidated by 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  A sentence could depart from the 
Guidelines upon consideration of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that the 
court found the Guidelines did not taken into account.  Id.   
 28. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007).  The goal of the Guide-
lines were to “further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapaci-
tation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
1A1.2 (2011) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL], available at http://www.ussc.gov 
/guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/index.cfm. 
 29. An offense level is determined from the underlying conviction and is ad-
justed based on factors such as the victim, any obstruction of justice on part of the 
defendant, or the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.  GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
supra note 28, § 1B1.1(a).  
 30. Id.  The Sentencing Table is a grid wherein the “offense level” is placed on 
the vertical axis, the “criminal history category” is on the horizontal axis, and the 
appropriate range is where the two intersect.  See id. § 5A. 
 31. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 96; see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 
349 (2007) (explaining how the Commission “modif[ied] and adjust[ed] past practice 
in the interests of greater rationality, avoiding inconsistency, complying with congres-
sional instructions, and the like”). 
 32. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
 33. 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). 
 34. Id. at 227. 
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the district court judge determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the defendant possessed additional cocaine35 and obstructed justice; consider-
ing these new circumstances, the district court calculated an enhanced Guide-
lines range of 360 months to life in prison.36   
The Court held that imposing the enhanced sentence violated the defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.37  To comply with the Sixth 
Amendment, the Court concluded that any facts supporting an enhanced sen-
tence must be either admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.38  Because the Guidelines allowed a judge, rather than a 
jury, to find facts that would raise a defendant’s maximum sentence, the 
Court severed the mandatory aspect of the sentencing statute, holding that a 
sentencing court must merely consider the Guidelines range as one factor 
among many in determining a sentence term.39 
Booker further defended the trial judge’s discretionary power in sentenc-
ing by excising an amendment to the SRA that required departures from 
Guidelines sentences to be reviewed de novo.40  As the Court noted, the mo-
tivation behind the amendment had been “to make Guidelines sentencing 
even more mandatory than it had been,” and after holding the Guidelines to 
be advisory, this justification “ceased to be relevant.”41  In lieu of the de novo 
standard, the Court held that appellate courts should review sentencing deci-
sions under the deferential reasonableness standard that existed before the 
amendment.42 
After the Booker Court described the Guidelines as a factor in sentenc-
ing, Rita v. United States shed light on the legal weight of the Guidelines by 
holding that a sentence within the Guidelines is presumed reasonable on re-
view.43  The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that a “within-
Guidelines” sentence reflects the fact that both the Commission and the sen-
tencing judge reached the same sentencing conclusion in a particular case, 
warranting the reasonable presumption.44  However, this presumption only 
applies when an appellate court is reviewing a sentence; the Court later made 
clear in Gall v. United States that the district court judge, in considering sec-
  
 35. Specifically, the defendant was found to possess 566 additional grams of 
cocaine.  Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 226-27. 
 38. Id. at 244. 
 39. Id. at 227, 245.  
 40. Id. at 260-61 (severing the de novo review standard codified in 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(e) (2006)). 
 41. Id. at 261. 
 42. Id.  
 43. 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).   
 44. Id. at 347 (reasoning that the “double determination” by the judge and the 
Commission “significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable 
one.”). 
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tion 3553(a) factors, “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reason-
able.”45  While Rita’s holding is only applicable when the Commission and a 
district judge are in an agreement, the Court acknowledged there would be 
times when a Guidelines sentence should not apply.46  Just a few months 
later, the Court in Kimbrough v. United States squarely confronted the issue 
about what a district court is authorized to do when it does not agree with the 
Commission.47  
In Kimbrough, the Guidelines suggested a sentence of 228 to 270 
months for a defendant who had been convicted of multiple offenses, includ-
ing possession of crack cocaine.48  However, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia deemed the suggested range to be “greater 
than necessary” and only sentenced him to 180 months.49  In imposing the 
downward sentence, the judge considered the “disproportionate and unjust 
effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.”50  For example, had 
Kimbrough possessed cocaine in powder form instead of crack, the Guide-
lines range would have only been 97 to 106 months.51  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence on the grounds 
that it was per se unreasonable for the district court to impose a sentence out-
side the Guidelines based on a disagreement with the sentencing imbalance 
between crack and powder cocaine offenses.52 
On appeal, the government argued that Congress, through the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, “‘[i]mplicit[ly]’ require[d] the Commission and sentenc-
ing courts to apply the ‘100-to-1 ratio’” for crack and powder cocaine of-
fenses,53 warranting a necessary disparity arising from the sentences.54  The 
Supreme Court of the United States rejected the government’s claim and de-
clined to find an implicit congressional directive behind the Guidelines’ sen-
  
 45. 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007). 
 46. Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (suggesting a Guidelines sentence should not apply if 
the court finds that “the case at hand falls outside the ‘heartland’ to which the Com-
mission intends individual Guidelines to apply”). 
 47. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007). 
 48. Id. at 91-92. 
 49. Id. at 92-93.  The district court’s language reflects what is commonly re-
ferred to as the “parsimony principle,” which requires a sentence be “not greater than 
necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.”  United States v. Rodríguez, 527 
F.3d 221, 228 (1st Cir. 2008); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).  The parsimony 
principle is considered the overarching principle behind a judge’s discretionary sen-
tencing. See Rodríguez, 527 F.3d at 228. 
 50. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 93 (quoting Joint Appendix, Vol. 1, Kimbrough, 552 
U.S. 85 (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2219925, at *72).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. The 100-to-1 ratio adopted by Congress “treated every gram of crack cocaine 
as . . . equivalent . . . [to] 100 grams of powder cocaine” for purposes of setting the 
minimum and maximum sentences for cocaine trafficking offenses.  Id. at 96.  
 54. Id. at 102. 
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tences.55  Further, the Court refused to give much deference to the Commis-
sion’s Guidelines in this case because the Commission had abandoned its 
characteristic institutional role by not accounting for “empirical data and na-
tional experience.”56  The Court held it is not unreasonable for sentencing 
courts to vary from Guidelines based on a disagreement with the Commis-
sion’s policy.57  
As these recent cases illustrate, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has been reluctant to dilute judicial discretion in sentencing, and the Kim-
brough Court’s refusal to find an implicit directive makes clear that any con-
gressional limit to judicial discretion in sentencing must be express. 
C.  Establishment of Fast-Track Programs 
Long before any congressional authorization, the Offices of the United 
States Attorneys implemented fast-track sentencing programs in the mid-
1990s to cope with an overwhelming volume of immigration-related cases.58  
As an example of this heavy caseload, consider the 29,939 illegal aliens re-
moved in 1990, 11,569 of which were due to criminal convictions.59  By 
1996, those numbers had risen to 68,657 aliens removed and 36,909 removals 
due to criminal convictions.60  Of course, the number of illegal aliens arrested 
would have been much higher; for example, it has been estimated that half a 
million illegal aliens are arrested and detained in the Southern District of 
  
 55. Id. at 103 (concluding that “[d]rawing meaning from silence [would be] 
particularly inappropriate here, for Congress has shown that it knows how to direct 
sentencing practices in express terms”). 
 56. Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 
2007), vacated, 552 U.S. 1306 (2008)).  Rather than basing the sentences for cocaine 
offenses on research, the Commission employed the 100-to-1 ratio from the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act.  Id. at 96-97.  After promulgating these Guidelines, the Commission 
concluded that use of the ratio created a disparity that “fails to meet the sentencing 
objectives[.]”  Id. at 97 (quoting U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 91 (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs 
/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_Cocaine_Senten
cing_Policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf).  It sought to 
amend the Guidelines, but Congress repeatedly rejected the Commission’s proposals.  
Id. at 99. 
 57. See id. at 111.   
 58. Thomas E. Gorman, A History of Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 311, 311 (2009).  The sudden influx of immigration cases was partly due to the 
increase in the Border Patrol’s budget and partly because of expanded applicability of 
illegal re-entry offense to more defendants.  Id. 
 59. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1996 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 171, available at http://www.dhs.gov 
/files/statistics/publications/archive.shtm#1. 
 60. Id. 
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California each year.61  Due to the sheer volume of aliens arrested, prosecu-
tions were rare, and felony cases were often pled down to misdemeanors car-
rying minimal penalties.62 
To expedite these cases, United States Attorneys, predominately in dis-
tricts near the southwestern border, began developing fast-track systems.63  
The program executed in the Southern District of California dealt primarily 
with aliens charged under 8 U.S.C. section 1326 for illegal re-entry.64  It used 
a “charge bargaining” program wherein prosecutors would substitute an ille-
gal entry charge punishable up to twenty years with one carrying a maximum 
penalty of only two years.65  However, the reduced sentence required the 
defendant to:   
(1) waive indictment; (2) forego motions; (3) waive presentence 
report; (4) stipulate to a particular sentence . . . ; (5) submit to im-
mediate sentencing; (6) waive all sentencing appeals; (7) consent 
to the entry of an order . . . removing defendant from the United 
States upon conclusion of his or her prison term; and (8) waive all 
appeals of the removal order.66 
The prompt guilty plea and immediate deportation, without the threat of 
a prolonged hearing and appeals process, “fast-tracks” a defendant through 
the judicial system, allowing prosecutors to focus their time and resources on 
other cases.67 
In the Southern District of California, the fast-track program proved 
successful with 1334 cases filed under section 1326 during the program’s first 
year, compared to the 240 cases filed the previous year.68  Though sentencing 
discretion is traditionally placed with the judiciary, the courts did not seem to 
  
 61. Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Border: Reinvent-
ing Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
285, 287 (1998).  It should be noted that the criminal caseload rate in the Southern 
District of California is higher than in any other district.  Id.  About half of all illegal 
aliens caught in the country are apprehended in that district.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 287-88.  
 63. United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2011).  It is 
estimated that about half of the ninety-four judicial districts had some form of a fast-
track program by 2003.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 64 (2003), 
[hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS], http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and 
_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Departures/200310_RtC_Do
wnward_Departures/departrpt03.pdf. 
 64. Bersin & Feigin, supra note 61, at 301. 
 65. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)-(b) (2006). 
 66. Bersin & Feigin, supra note 61, at 301. 
 67. See id.  
 68. Id. at 302. 
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mind such bold prosecutorial discretion in these cases.69  When the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a petitioner’s claim that 
the fast-track program discriminates based on race and deprived him of effec-
tive counsel, it praised the program for “benefit[ing] the government and the 
court system by relieving court congestion.”70 
In 2003, Congress formally authorized fast-track programs in the Prose-
cutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End Exploitation of Children Act (the 
PROTECT Act).71  While the PROTECT Act was part of an initiative de-
signed to curtail a purported increase in Guideline departures,72 in section 
401(m)(2)(B) of the Act, Congress directed the Commission to promulgate “a 
policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than [four] 
levels if the [g]overnment files a motion for such departure pursuant to an 
early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the United 
States Attorney[.]”73  It is ironic that Congress authorized fast-track sentenc-
ing in an act that is clearly devoted to reducing downward departures, but 
legislative history indicates Congress intended this authorization to decrease 
intradistrict disparity between the defendants who were charged and the 
criminals who were not due to administrative restraints.74 
Because Congress required the Attorney General to authorize each fast-
track program,75 then-Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum 
  
 69. See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Like 
the district court, we find absolutely nothing wrong (and, quite frankly, a great deal 
right) with such a practice.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 
(2003). 
 72. See 149 CONG. REC. S5115 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement by Sen. 
Hatch) (discussing how “courts, unfortunately, have strayed further and further from 
this [Guidelines] system”); see also 149 CONG. REC. S5130 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) 
(statement by Sen. Sessions) (indicating that “[t]he Feeney amendment was designed 
to deal with a growing problem of Federal judges downward-departing from the man-
dates of the sentencing guidelines and thereby giving lighter sentences than should be 
given to criminals”). 
 73. PROTECT Act, § 401(m)(2)(B).  
 74. 149 CONG. REC. H2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement by Rep. Feeney) 
(noting that authorization of these programs is needed to “avoid unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparities within a given district”). 
 75. The language of the PROTECT Act did not actually require the Attorney 
General to authorize the fast-track programs; it just stipulated that any program to 
grant a downward departure be authorized by the Attorney General.  PROTECT Act, 
§ 401(m)(2)(B).  The Attorney General issued a separate memorandum also requiring 
the Attorney General’s approval for any fast-track program that relied upon “charge 
bargaining” – a program whereby the government charged a lesser offense in ex-
change for a guilty plea.  Memorandum Regarding Policy on Charging of Criminal 
Defendants from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to all Fed. Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm.  
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directing all United States Attorneys to “ensure that ‘fast-track’ programs are 
implemented only when warranted.”76  The most critical requirement was that 
the district must face an exceptionally high volume of a specific class of of-
fenses, excluding crimes of violence that constrain the judicial and prosecuto-
rial resources.77  Additionally, the Attorney General required that the program 
itself include certain elements, including stipulating to a factual basis and 
waiving rights to pre-trial motions and post-conviction challenges.78  In ac-
cordance with its role, the Commission promulgated U.S.S.G. section 5K3.1, 
which allowed a downward departure up to four levels through a fast-track 
program.79  By 2010, at least eighteen districts granted downward departures 
pursuant to section 5K3.1.80 
D.  Sentencing in Non-Fast-Track Jurisdictions: A Circuit Split 
Because defendants in non-fast-track districts could not receive the same 
downward departure available to their counterparts in districts with a fast-
  
Charge bargaining is distinct from “downward departure” fast-track programs, which 
reduce the defendant’s offense level but still charge the defendant with the same of-
fense.  McKay, supra note 21, at 1436. 
 76. Memorandum Regarding Deptarment Principles for Implementing an Expe-
dited Disposition or “Fast-Track” Prosecution Program from John Ashcroft, Attorney 
Gen., to all U.S. Attorneys (Sept 22, 2003), reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 318, 
319 (2009).   
 77. Id.  Proposals for implementing fast-track programs also require a demon-
stration that the specific class of cases is one that is highly repetitive and substantially 
factually similar and that a reduction of such cases in favor of state prosecution is 
unavailable.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 320.  However, the defendant is not required to waive his right to chal-
lenge a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
 79. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5K3.1.  The Commission practically 
replicated the language used by Congress in the PROTECT Act.  See id. (“Upon mo-
tion of the Government, the court may depart downward not more than [four] levels 
pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the 
United States and the United States Attorney for the district in which the court re-
sides.”).  In a report filed by the Commission, it claimed that the reason for using the 
same language as section 401(m)(B) of the PROTECT Act is that “[t]he Department 
of Justice requested that the Commission implement [Congress’s] directive . . . in a 
similar unfettered manner by merely restating the legislative language.”  REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 63, at 66. 
 80. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTIC INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL 
YEAR 2010, FIRST CIRCUIT 12-17 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics 
/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/State_District_Circuit/2010/1c10.pdf.  While this 
figure may seem low, this only includes programs that provide for a downwards de-
parture pursuant to section 53K.1; it does not account for the many fast-track pro-
grams authorized by the Attorney General which utilize a charge-bargaining process 
like the one described from the Southern District of California.  See id.; see also supra 
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.  
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track program, inconsistencies developed in the sentences imposed.81  Courts 
ordered different prison terms for two defendants convicted of the same crime 
and possessing the same criminal history; defendants in non-fast-track dis-
tricts usually received a Guidelines sentence, while fast-track defendants en-
joyed a lighter one.82  Defendants in non-fast-track districts began to claim 
that this disparity was “unwarranted,” pointing to 18 U.S.C. section 
3553(a)(6), which requires courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct.”83  These defendants argued that, with the 
discretion authorized by Booker, sentencing courts could depart from the 
Guidelines based on this disparity.84  Prior to Kimbrough, almost every circuit 
had held that the disparity between fast-track and non-fast-track districts was 
not “unwarranted” because Congress, “by directing that the Sentencing 
Commission provide for guideline departures in certain judicial districts [in 
the PROTECT Act], ‘concluded that the advantages stemming from fast-track 
programs outweigh[ed] their disadvantages, and that any disparity that results 
from fast-track programs is not ‘unwarranted.’’”85  
 
1.  Anti-Discretionary Circuits 
 
In its opinion in United States v. Gomez-Herrera, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit to readdress the 
issue of fast-track disparity after the Kimbrough decision.86  The defendant in 
Gomez-Herrera pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following removal pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. section 1326 in a district without a fast-track program.87  The 
sentencing court imposed a Guidelines sentence despite the defendant’s ar-
gument that he should receive a downward departure because of the disparity 
  
 81. See United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated 
by United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 82. See id. at 914. 
 83. See United States v. Andújar-Arias, 507 F.3d 734, 738 (1st Cir. 2007), abro-
gated by United States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 2008); Sebastian, 436 
F.3d at 915. 
 84. See Andújar-Arias, 507 F.3d at 737-38; Sebastian, 436 F.3d at 915. 
 85. Sebastian, 436 F.3d at 916 (quoting United States v. Perez-Chavez, 422 F. 
Supp. 2d 1255, 1263 (D. Utah 2005)); see also Andújar-Arias, 507 F.3d at 742; 
United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 98-100 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Perez-
Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 243 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 
1252-53 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 542 (7th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Marcail-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Hernandez-Cervantes, 161 Fed. App’x 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 86. 523 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 87. Id. at 556. 
11
Weber: Weber: Fast-Track Sentencing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: WeberPaginated.docx Created on:  6/24/13 11:01 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:41 PM 
1238 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77   
 
between districts employing fast-track programs and those that do not.88  On 
appeal, the defendant maintained that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kim-
brough overruled Fifth Circuit authority and authorized sentencing in dis-
agreement with policy choices of the Guidelines.89  The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that “Kimbrough, which concerned a district court’s ability to 
sentence in disagreement with Guideline policy, [did] not control this case, 
which concerns a district court’s ability to sentence in disagreement with 
Congressional policy.”90  To support its conclusion that fast-track disparity 
was an issue of congressional policy, the court noted that the text of the 
PROTECT Act clearly limits fast-track departures to programs authorized by 
the Attorney General.91   
After determining that Kimbrough did not control this case, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the sentencing disparity could not be labeled as “unwar-
ranted.”92  Falling back on its line of pre-Kimbrough cases, the court declined 
to call a disparity “unwarranted” “when the disparity was specifically author-
ized by Congress in the PROTECT Act.”93  The court reasoned that the “gov-
ernment’s decision to offer a fast-track plea offer is no different from the 
Attorney General’s prosecutorial discretion regarding whether to prosecute, 
what charge to file, whether to offer a plea agreement,” none of which have 
been found to beget unwarranted disparities in sentencing.94 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in United 
States v. Vega-Castillo, also declined to overturn its precedent that sentencing 
courts are not required to depart from Guidelines based on the limited avail-
ability of fast-track sentencing programs.95  The defendant in Vega-Castillo 
appealed his sentence after the district court refused his request to mitigate 
fast-track disparity by granting its own downward departure.96  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that its prior precedent rule did not authorize overturning the 
circuit’s previous cases on fast-track disparity because those cases did not 
directly conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in Kimbrough regarding 
the crack/powder cocaine disparity.97  Further, the Eleventh Circuit main-
tained that this was an issue regarding a court’s discretion to disagree with 
congressional policy, as distinguished from a court’s discretion to disagree 
  
 88. Id. at 556-57.  The defendant also proffered several other reasons for a 
downward departure to no avail.  Id. 
 89. Id. at 559. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 560-61. 
 92. Id. at 562. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 561. 
 95. 540 F.3d 1235, 1236-38 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  
 96. Id. at 1236. 
 97. Id. at 1238-39.  Under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior precedent rule, the court 
could only overturn prior precedent en banc or by a conflicting Supreme Court deci-
sion.  Id. at 1236. 
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with Guidelines policy, which was addressed in Kimbrough.98  Similarly, in 
United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit interpreted the PROTECT Act as illustrating that fast-track 
disparity is a matter of congressional policy and refused to overturn its prece-
dent based on Kimbrough, holding that sentencing discrepancy originating 
from fast-track programs is not unwarranted.99 
 
2.  Pro-Discretionary Circuits 
 
In contrast to the Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits, the First Circuit 
overturned its precedent in United States v. Rodríguez, holding that a sentenc-
ing court commits error when it does not consider disparity incident to the 
absence of a fast-track program.100  In Rodríguez, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to illegal reentry following removal in a non-fast-track district and 
argued for a below-Guidelines sentence based on the inequality in sentencing 
between defendants in fast-track districts and those in non-fast-track dis-
tricts.101  The First Circuit called attention to recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence that “emphasiz[ed] the breadth of a district court’s discretion to deviate 
from a defendant’s [Guidelines sentence].”102   
Rather than distinguishing Kimbrough because it involved the 
crack/powder cocaine ratio, the court believed that the Court’s approach in 
Kimbrough “plainly ha[d] wider implications” affecting a number of its ear-
lier cases.103  The First Circuit’s pre-Kimbrough cases had only evaluated the 
issue of whether a particular disparity could be a relevant consideration under 
a subsection of section 3553(a).104  However, Kimbrough, as the First Circuit 
interpreted it, undermines those cases by “counsel[ing] a new and different 
approach to section 3553(a)” that requires a sentencing judge to “engage in a 
more holistic inquiry” and reflect on all factors in section 3553(a) together.105  
According to the court, the overarching principle of the sentencing statute, 
found in section 3553(a), is to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater 
  
 98. Id. at 1239 (citing Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d at 563). 
 99. 556 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2009).  While the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits seem to be in agreement that fast-track programs are a matter of congres-
sional policy, the Government eventually realized this was a losing argument and 
stopped trying to argue in these cases that the “congressional policy concerning fast-
track programs prohibited the exercise of a district court’s discretion.”  United Stated 
v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 150 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 100. 527 F.3d 221, 231 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 101. Id. at 223. 
 102. Id. at 225 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48-51 (2007); Kim-
brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101-02, 109-11 (2007)). 
 103. Id. at 226.  
 104. Id. at 227-28; see, e.g., United States v. Andújar-Arias, 507 F.3d 734, 736 
(1st Cir. 2007), abrogated by Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221. 
 105. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d at 227-28. 
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than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.”106  In view of the goals 
of sentencing, the court held that consideration of fast-track disparity is not 
barred by section 3553(a) and refusal to consider such disparity is procedural 
error.107 
The Rodriquez court also emphasized the similarities between the 
crack/powder ratio discussed in Kimbrough and fast-track departure: they had 
“been both blessed by Congress and openly criticized by the Sentencing 
Commission,”108 and neither “exemplif[ies] the . . . Commission’s exercise of 
its characteristic institutional role.”109  Finding the government’s “implicit 
congressional directive”110 argument in fast-track sentencing cases similar to 
the government’s argument in Kimbrough, the court refused to conclude that 
the PROTECT Act restricted a district court’s sentencing discretion, either 
expressly or implicitly.111  Without an “unambiguous congressional direc-
tive,” the court concluded sentencing judges are not barred from considering 
this disparity.112 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United 
States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, aligned itself with the First Circuit’s pro-
discretion stance.113  The defendant in Arrelucea-Zamudio pleaded guilty to 
illegal reentry and argued for a downward variance based on the lack of 
availability of fast-track sentencing.114  On appeal of a within-Guidelines 
sentence, the court was not persuaded by the analyses of this issue in the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and found “[f]ocusing on congressional 
policy here [was] illusory.”115  In the opinion of the court, the lack of any 
explicit congressional restraint on judicial discretion in downward departures 
for those in non-fast-track districts was dispositive.116  Additionally, the court 
noted that the Commission has even speculated about a potential unwarranted 
disparity based on geography caused by its fast-track departure policy.117  
  
 106. Id. at 228 (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
 107. Id. at 229, 231. 
 108. Id. at 227. 
 109. Id. at 227 (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109) (internal quotations omit-
ted).  Like the crack/powder ratio, the Commission formulated the fast-track departure 
guidelines without taking into account “empirical data and national experience.”  Id. 
(quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109) (internal quotations omitted). 
 110. United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 151 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 111. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d  at 229-30. 
 112. Id. at 230. 
 113. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 150. 
 114. Id. at 144.  
 115. Id. at 150. 
 116. Id. at 151. 
 117. Id. at 153. 
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Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that “a district court [may] consider a vari-
ance on the basis of [the] fast-track argument.”118 
The circuit split on the issue evened up when the Sixth Circuit joined the 
First and Third Circuits in holding that sentencing courts have discretion to 
consider the disparity in sentencing between similarly situated defendants due 
to the existence or non-existence of fast-track programs.119  Following the 
reasoning of the First Circuit, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Kimbrough 
undermined any claim of an implicit directive from Congress on sentencing 
matters, and it remanded the case so that the sentencing court could take into 
account the fast-track sentencing disparity argument.120 
The fundamental distinction in the pro-discretionary view adopted by 
the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits and the anti-discretionary view advocated 
by the Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits is whether the disparity resulting 
from selective deployment of fast-track programs is unwarranted.  The classi-
fication of the disparity as warranted or unwarranted depended on the cir-
cuit’s interpretation of section 401(m)(2)(B) of the PROTECT Act and 
whether an implied congressional directive to the Commission can bind dis-
trict courts.  The split left district court judges in other circuits with the uncer-
tainty created by the circuits’ mixed messages. 
E.  The Resolution of an Analogous Circuit Split 
The distinction between Guidelines and congressional policy is also a 
critical inquiry in another area of judicial discretion: career-offender sentenc-
ing.  Similar to how Congress directed the Commission to promulgate fast-
track Guidelines in the PROTECT Act, section 994(h) of the SRA instructed 
the Commission to establish guidelines specifically for career-offenders – 
defendants with multiple prior felony convictions.121  In response, the Com-
mission set out a sentencing policy for career-offenders in section 4B1.1 of 
the Guidelines.122 
After the Supreme Court of the United States’ expansion of judicial sen-
tencing discretion in Kimbrough, the circuits split on whether a district court 
may depart from the Guidelines if it disagrees with the career-offender 
Guidelines.123  In United States v. Vasquez, the Eleventh Circuit held that it 
  
 118. Id. at 156. 
 119. United States v. Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d 244, 250-51 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 120. Id. at 249-50. 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006) (“The Commission shall assure that the guidelines 
specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized 
for categories of defendants in which the defendant . . . has been convicted of a felony 
. . . and . . . has previously been convicted of two or more prior felonies”). 
 122. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 4B1.1.  
 123. See United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (“‘[T]he 
Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that all of the sentencing guidelines are 
advisory’ . . . [and t]hat holds true for the career-offender provisions” (quoting United 
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was reasonable for a district court to refuse to consider its disagreement with 
the Guidelines’ increased penalties for career offenders when imposing a 
repeat drug offender’s sentence.124  The court reasoned that because section 
4B1.1 reflects Congress’s policy of harsher punishment for recidivist drug 
offenders, it is impermissible to vary from these Guidelines.125 
When Vazquez was pending on appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan recommended that the 
Court vacate the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and remand.126  She admitted 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that a “sentencing court cannot disagree 
with the policy of the career offender guideline . . . is inconsistent with [the 
Court’s] conception of the nature of the advisory Guidelines regime under 
Booker and Kimbrough.”127  According to Kagan, the Eleventh Circuit had 
founded its opinion on the “premise that congressional directives to the Sen-
tencing Commission are equally binding on sentencing courts,” which is in-
correct.128  The Court subsequently vacated judgment and remanded the 
case.129  
In light of Vazquez, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit – the only other circuit to prohibit variance due to a disagreement with 
the Guidelines’ career-offender policy – held that “district judges are entitled 
to disagree with the Commission’s policy choices” and section 4B1.1 of the 
Guidelines is not mandatory.130  Unlike the courts that decided the fast-track 
issue, the circuits had harmonized in authorizing district courts to sentence in 
disagreement with the Guidelines for career-offenders. 
  
States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Gray, 577 
F.3d 947, 949-50 (8th Cir. 2009) (indicating that the sentencing court has authority to 
consider disagreement with the career-offender Guidelines in varying from the Guide-
lines); United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
disagreement with the career-offender Guidelines policy is a permissible reason to 
deviate).  But see United States v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding 
a sentencing court is required to sentence a career offender within the section 4B1.1 
range), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2061 (2010); United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 
1227-28 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that “the district court properly refused to consider 
its disagreement with the Guidelines’ treatment of career offenders when it imposed 
its sentence”), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010). 
 124. Vazquez, 558 F.3d at 1228. 
 125. Id. at 1227.  This idea that, because certain Guidelines merely echo congres-
sional policy, they cannot provide a basis for departures is the same logic adopted by 
the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in fast-track cases.  See supra Part II.D. 
 126. Brief for the United States at 17, Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 
(2010) (No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 5423020, at *17. 
 127. Id. at 10.  
 128. Id. at 9. 
 129. Vazquez, 130 S. Ct. at 1135. 
 130. United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415-16 (7th Cir. 2010).  
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III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Recent judicial and administrative developments have furthered the fast-
track debate.  This Part describes how the Seventh and Eighth Circuits 
weighed in on the issue, favoring judicial consideration of the fast-track dis-
parity in sentencing a defendant in a non-fast-track district.  Next, it explains 
the DOJ’s new policy for authorizing fast-track programs, which is designed 
to resolve the circuit split on this issue. 
A.  Circuit Split Favors Discretion to Vary Based on Fast-Track Dis-
parity 
With the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 
the circuit split on the fast-track issue tipped in favor of the pro-discretion 
side.131  The Seventh Circuit consolidated two cases to review the fast-track 
issue.132  In the first case, the government removed Jaime Reyes-Hernandez, a 
non-citizen, from the United States after he was convicted of robbery.133  
Reyes-Hernandez was discovered after returning to the country illegally, and 
he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. sections 1326(a) 
and (b)(2).134  Based on the offense and Reyes-Hernandez’s criminal history, 
the presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of forty-one to fifty-one 
months, and the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of forty-one months.135  
The defendant in the second case, Pedro Sanchez-Gonzalez, pleaded guilty to 
illegal reentry following a conviction of domestic battery.136  He received a 
Guidelines sentence of seventy-seven months.137  In both cases, the district 
court refused to consider departing from the Guidelines despite the defen-
dants’ claims that a disparity in sentencing existed due to the district’s lack of 
a fast-track option.138 
After considering the Court’s jurisprudence on judicial sentencing dis-
cretion, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “district judges are at liberty to 
  
 131. 624 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 132. Id. at 407. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 408. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 409. 
 138. Id. at 407.  The sentencing judge in Reyes-Hernandez’s case cited to a pre-
Kimbrough case holding that such discrepancies in sentencing were not unreasonable.  
Id. at 408.  The judge presiding over Sanchez-Gonzalez’s sentencing hearing held that 
he was bound to pre-Kimbrough cases as well.  Id. at 409.  However, he acknowl-
edged that it seemed “unjust to permit sentencing disparities based on the fortuity of 
the judicial district in which a defendant in an illegal reentry case is charged.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
17
Weber: Weber: Fast-Track Sentencing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: WeberPaginated.docx Created on:  6/24/13 11:01 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:41 PM 
1244 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77   
 
reject any Guideline on policy grounds.”139  This conclusion had been the 
basis of the court’s recent reconsideration of judicial discretion to vary from 
career-offender Guidelines in United States v. Corner.140  Given the parallels 
between Corner and the fast-track issue, the court believed Corner largely 
“eviscerate[d] the government’s position” that district courts are bound by 
Guidelines directed from Congress.141  The Seventh Circuit interpreted the 
Court’s disposition of Vazquez to reflect an understanding that congressional 
directives to the Commission do not have the same legal force as statutes.142  
The court held that a sentencing judge is permitted to consider a facially ob-
vious disparity, including those caused by a lack of fast-track programs, 
among the totality of the factors found in section 3553(a) and refusal to do so 
is error.143 
The government also argued in Reyes-Hernandez that granting judges in 
non-fast-track districts the ability to consider fast-track disparity in sentenc-
ing downward infringes on the principle of separation of powers.144  The gov-
ernment claimed that because Congress authorized the Attorney General to 
set up fast-track programs on a district-by-district basis, the departures from 
the Guidelines offered under the guise of fast-track programs should be a 
determination for the executive branch.145  However, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected this argument, reasoning that consideration of disparate sentencing 
practices while crafting an appropriate sentence is “an unquestionably judicial 
function.”146 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit added to the 
circuit split by authorizing judicial sentencing discretion in light of the dispar-
ity produced from fast-track programs.147  In May 2010, a police officer ar-
rested Baltazar Jiminez-Perez148 for failure to possess a valid driver’s license 
and insurance.149  Because Jiminez-Perez was an illegal alien and had previ-
ously been deported in 2008 after two unlawful drug possession convictions, 
  
 139. Id. at 415 (quoting United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. Id. at 416; see Corner, 598 F.3d at 415-16. 
 141. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d at 416. 
 142. Id. at 417; see supra Part II.E. 
 143. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d at 421. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 230 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 147. See United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704, 71 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 148. To clarify any potential confusion, “Jiminez” is not a typo; while the appel-
late opinion refers to the defendant as Jimenez, defendant’s brief refers to him as 
Jiminez.  
 149. Brief of Appellee, Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704 (No. 10-3757-EMSL), 2011 
WL 1160652, at *3.  The officer initiated a routine stop of Jiminez-Perez after being 
notified of a “reckless driver” and noticing that the car driven by Jiminez-Perez was 
missing a tire and license plates.  Id. 
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he was charged with one count of illegal reentry subsequent to a felony con-
viction, a violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1326(a).150   
Like many defendants before him, Jiminez-Perez pleaded guilty to this 
charge and motioned for a downward variance from the Guidelines sentenc-
ing range to compensate for the unwarranted sentencing disparity caused by 
the lack of a fast-track program in his jurisdiction.151  The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the request, explaining 
that it felt uncomfortable granting a variance based on this consideration 
without more definitive guidance from the Eighth Circuit on the issue.152  
Consequently, the district court sentenced Jiminez-Perez to thirty months in 
prison, the minimum Guidelines term.153 
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Jiminez-Perez argued that “the district 
court procedurally erred by failing to recognize its own discretionary author-
ity to vary downward from [his] advisory Guidelines range to account for a 
sentencing disparity among illegal reentry defendants caused by the inconsis-
tent availability of ‘[f]ast[-t]rack’ sentencing programs.”154  While Eighth 
Circuit precedent clearly permitted a sentencing judge not to vary downward 
based on inconsistencies created by these programs, Jiminez-Perez urged the 
court to follow the lead of other circuits and reconsider the issue based on 
Kimbrough.155  The government maintained that the district court’s failure to 
consider the disparity created by fast-track programs did not constitute an 
error according to United States v. Sebastion and subsequent Eighth Circuit 
cases rejecting the same claim made by Jiminez-Perez.156  It urged the court 
to follow the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that fast-track dis-
parities cannot be the basis for downward variance from sentencing guide-
lines because they are not “unwarranted.”157  
  
 150. Id. at 1, 3; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (2006) (providing that any alien “whose 
removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of . . . a felony . . . shall be 
fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both”).  
 151. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d at 705.   
 152. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704 (No. 10-3757-
EMSL), 2011 WL 585534, at *5-6 [hereinafter Brief of Defendant]. 
 153. Id. at *1.   
 154. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d at 705-06.  He also argued that the sentence im-
posed was substantively unreasonable in that it failed to take into consideration all 
relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a), namely the need to “avoid unwar-
ranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct.”  Id. at 706 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the court disposed of the case on the 
procedural issue, it declined to discuss the merits of this argument.  Id. at 706. 
 155. Brief of Defendant, supra note 152, at *8-9. 
 156. Brief of Appellee, supra note 149, at *7-8 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-
Alvarado, 477 F.3d 648, 651 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by United 
States v. Bain, 477 F.3d 648, 651 (8th Cir. 2008)); United States v. Sebastian, 436 
F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 157. Id. at *9-10. 
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The Eighth Circuit agreed with Jiminez-Perez, as well as the First, 
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, that Kimbrough made clear that inconsis-
tencies in sentencing would not be implicitly authorized by Congress.158  
Therefore, the court found Kimbrough had “undermine[d] the rationale” sup-
porting its prior cases “disallow[ing] variances based on the unavailability of 
[f]ast-[t]rack” in a district based on Congress’s supposed implied authoriza-
tion.159  The court also refused to rely on its pre-Kimbrough precedent be-
cause those cases had “only inquired whether a district court [could] vary 
downward pursuant exclusively” to section 3553(a)(6).160  As noted by the 
First Circuit, this mentality regarding consideration of the factors found in 
section 3553(a) conflicts with the new “holistic” approach counseled by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Kimbrough.161  Rather, a sentencing 
judge should consider any unwarranted disparity caused by fast-track pro-
grams in conjunction with all the other factors of section 3553(a).162  The 
court determined that the district court’s “fail[ure] to recognize its sentencing 
discretion” based on this unwarranted disparity was a procedural error,163 and 
it remanded the case for resentencing.164 
B.  The Department of Justice’s Solution to Fast-Track Disparity 
The DOJ recognized that the circuit split only generated additional dis-
parities in sentencing.165  After conducting a review on fast-track programs, 
  
 158. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d at 708-09. 
 159. Id. at 708.  See generally Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913 (outlining the Eight Cir-
cuit’s previous reasoning for disallowing variance based upon the unavailability of a 
fast-track program).  There had also been a post-Kimbrough case that relied on Sebas-
tian.  See United States v. Rosario-Moctezuma, 411 Fed. App’x 942, 943-44 (8th Cir. 
2011) (relying on Gonzalez-Alvarado, 477 F.3d at 943-44, which relies on Sebastian, 
436 F.3d at 916).  The government argued that this recent decision foreclosed 
Jiminez-Perez’s arguments, but the appellate court disagreed, finding that Rosario-
Moctezuma “lack[ed] controlling authority” because it had been unpublished and 
failed to mention Kimbrough.  Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d at 707. 
 160. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d at 710. 
 161. Id. (quoting United States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227-28 (1st Cir. 
2008)). 
 162. Id. (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007)).  
 163. Id. at 706. 
 164. Id. at 711.  The court did caution that a variance solely on the basis of fast-
track could still be deemed unreasonable and advised varying only after “a holistic 
and meaningful review of all relevant § 3553(a) factors[.]”  Id. (quoting United States 
v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 421 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
 165. Memorandum Regarding Department Policy on Early Disposition or 
“Fast-Track” Programs, from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, to all United States Attorneys (Jan. 31, 2012) (“Because of this circuit 
conflict, USAOs in non-fast-track districts routinely face motions for variances 
based on fast-track programs in other districts. Courts that grant such variances 
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the DOJ revised its fast-track policy in January 2012.166  The new policy, as 
outlined in a memorandum issued by Deputy Attorney General James Cole, 
eliminates the requirement that the district face an extraordinary burden from 
a particular class of offenses and grants eligibility for fast-track departures to 
any qualified defendant, regardless of the prosecution location.167 
According to the revised policy, any defendant prosecuted for felony il-
legal reentry under 8 U.S.C. section 1326 is eligible for consideration of a 
fast-track program,168 and any district prosecuting such defendants are re-
quired to implement a fast-track program.169  United States Attorneys still 
retain prosecutorial “discretion [in] limit[ing] or deny[ing] a defendant’s par-
ticipation in the fast-track program based [upon] . . . [t]he defendant’s [his-
tory of] prior violent felony convictions, . . .  [t]he . . . number of prior depor-
tations, . . . [whether] the defendant is part of an independent federal criminal 
investigation, . . . [and] any other aggravating factors.”170  The other require-
ments for a fast-track program remain substantially the same with respect to 
what the defendant must do in order to receive a departure; however, a defen-
dant must now also “waive [his or her] right to argue for a variance” in sen-
tencing under 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a).171 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Before the recent change in policy, the fast-track program clearly un-
dermined Congress’s goals of avoiding unwarranted disparity in sentencing 
between similarly situated defendants and creating a transparent system.172  
Two defendants with identical criminal backgrounds could reenter the coun-
try illegally together, and if one was caught and arrested in a non-fast-track 
district while the other was convicted in district with a fast-track program, 
they would face different punishments for the same crime.  Such disparity 
was exactly why Congress attempted to practically eliminate judicial discre-
tion with mandatory Guidelines.173  
The lack of uniformity in the fast-track programs among the districts 
that employed them creates even more disparity in sentencing.  Some dis-
tricts, such as the Southern District of California, use a charge-bargaining, 
  
are left to impose sentences that introduce additional sentencing disparities.”) 
[hereinafter Cole Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-
program.pdf. 
 166. Id. at 2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 3. 
 169. Id. at 4. 
 170. Id. at 3. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
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fast-track program wherein a defendant may plead guilty to two counts of a 
lesser charge and receive a thirty-month sentence.174  Other districts just use 
the downward departures in sentencing, as provided in U.S.S.G. section 
5K3.1.175  Even among the districts providing departures pursuant to section 
5K3.1, there is variation because the Guidelines only require that the depar-
ture not exceed four levels instead of providing specific departures.176  For 
example, in the Western District of Texas, a defendant is only entitled to a 
one-level reduction by participating in the fast-track program, whereas a de-
fendant in the District of New Mexico receives a two-level reduction, and a 
defendant in the District of North Dakota is given a four-level reduction.177 
Moreover, the justification for fast-track departures became more ob-
scure when considering in what districts the Attorney General has authorized 
the programs.  Fast-track programs were established to cope with an explo-
sion of immigration-related cases, and Congress, in authorizing departures 
pursuant to fast-track programs, was motivated by the judicial and prosecuto-
rial strain of these cases in districts along the southwest border.178  However, 
fast-track programs in practice have not been so limited.  Districts handling a 
small number of immigration cases such as the Districts of North Dakota, 
Idaho, and Nebraska have fast-track programs authorized by the Attorney 
General.179  On the other hand, districts in Utah, Florida, Nevada, and New 
York that do handle a significant amount of immigration cases do not have 
fast-track programs.180  Because Congress could not have intended this dispa-
rate and perplexing deployment of fast-track programs, it was clear that a 
change was needed. 
The DOJ’s change in policy attempts to place similarly situated defen-
dants on more equal footing when it comes to potential sentences by allowing 
any defendant charged with a violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1326 to be fast-
track eligible.181  This move aligns with the trend in the circuit courts.  With 
  
 174. Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the 
Policy Paradox of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sen-
tences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 529 (2006). 
 175. Id. at 530. 
 176. Id. at 523. 
 177. Id. at 530. 
 178. 149 CONG. REC. H2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement by Rep. Feeney) 
(noting that programs should be reserved for offenses “whose high incidence[s] 
within the district [have] imposed an extraordinary strain on the resources of that 
district as compared to other districts”). 
 179. United States v. Perez-Chavez, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1267 (D. Utah 2005). 
 180. McClellan & Sands, supra note 174, at 531; see also Perez-Chavez, 422 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1267 (“North Dakota may be a ‘border state’; but unless it confronts some 
unheralded flood of illegal Canadian immigrants, it is unclear why it should operate a 
fast-track program while Utah (which has more illegal re-entry cases to prosecute) 
does not.”). 
 181. Cole Memo, supra note 165, at 2. 
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the addition of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, more circuits favor allowing 
a judicial consideration of the disparity.182  Thus, most circuits found the dis-
parity to be unwarranted.183 
Given its recent cases, if the Supreme Court of the United State were to 
decide this issue, it would likely agree with the pro-discretion faction.  Start-
ing with Booker, the Court has issued a line of cases that stresses judicial 
discretion in sentencing.184  As Gall illustrates, the Court has not allowed a 
district court to assume the Guidelines are reasonable,185 and under Kim-
brough, a sentencing judge may find them unreasonable based on a policy 
disagreement.186 
The similarities between fast-track cases with crack/powder cocaine 
cases and career offender cases also provide insight on how the Supreme 
Court of the United States would rule.  In all three types of cases, the gov-
ernment argued that any resulting disparity from the Guidelines could not be 
considered unwarranted because the Guidelines merely reflect congressional 
directives.187  The Court in Kimbrough quickly rejected this argument, con-
cluding that the Guidelines are not as binding on courts as statutes and reject-
ing an implied Congressional restriction on judicial sentencing discretion.188  
In Vazquez, the  Court accepted the Solicitor General’s recommendation that 
judgment should be vacated because it had been based on an incorrect prem-
ise that “congressional directives to Sentencing Commissions are equally 
binding on sentencing courts.”189 
In these cases, the Court focused on whether Congress had implicitly 
sanctioned sentencing disparities.  Based on this inquiry, the Court would not 
likely distinguish fast-track cases from Kimbrough simply because Kim-
brough concerned crack cocaine instead of illegal reentry.190  Accordingly, 
the Court likely would have found a disparity in sentences due to fast-track 
programs to be unwarranted and thus, an appropriate factor for consideration 
in departing downward. 
Congress, on the other hand, may not look so approvingly on the DOJ’s 
change in fast-track policy.  By lifting the restriction of the programs to dis-
  
 182. See supra Part III.A. 
 183. See supra Part III.A. 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). 
 186. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007). 
 187. See supra notes 53-56, 128, 156-57 and accompanying text. 
 188. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 103. 
 189. Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010); Brief for the United 
States, supra note 126, at *9.  Of course, the propositions in the Solicitor General’s 
brief carry no precedential weight, and the Supreme Court did not adopt those views 
merely by following the Solicitor General’s recommendation; however, the Court’s 
ultimate disposition of the case “indicates receptivity to them.”  United States v. Cor-
ner, 598 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 190. See United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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tricts experiencing an extraordinary load of illegal reentry cases, the new 
policy lessens sentencing disparities for similarly situated defendants.  This 
effect advances one of Congress’s stated goals in sentencing reform legisla-
tion from the 1980s: elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparities.191  
However, more recent legislation, including the PROTECT Act, has concen-
trated on reducing downward departures from the Guidelines.192 
While Congress may have authorized departures pursuant to fast-track 
programs in the PROTECT Act,193 it only did so after finding that the need to 
prosecute illegal reentry cases outweighed a desire to curb departures.194  This 
justification for downward departures no longer holds up under the new pol-
icy.  A district like the Eastern District of Missouri, where the defendant in 
Jimenez-Perez was sentenced, can grant downward departures to defendants 
charged with violating 8 U.S.C. section 1326 despite the fact that immigration 
cases make up less than three percent of the district’s caseload.195  It is doubt-
ful that there will be any appreciable increase in efficiency in such districts by 
fast-tracking the few defendants charged under section 1326.  The costs of 
granting departures in sentencing are not outweighed by a corresponding 
benefit in increased efficiency, and the compromise made by Congress in 
authorizing fast-track departures will become distorted. 
Conceivably, one could argue that the compromise remains balanced: 
the expense of allowing departures is balanced by the efficiency it brings to 
certain districts overwhelmed by immigration cases and by the lack of dispar-
ity manifested in the selective implementation of fast-track programs.  How-
ever, a similar harmonious result could be achieved by allowing the courts in 
non-fast-track districts to use their judicial sentencing discretion to grant de-
partures.  As previously discussed, there had been indications that the circuit 
split would have been resolved in favor of allowing district court judges to 
grant departures based on fast-track disparity.196  The judiciary has tradition-
ally held the function of determining sentences197 and even today, remains the 
ultimate authority.198  It may arguably be better to keep such discretion within 
  
 191. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
 192. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 193. Id. § 401(m)(2)(B). 
 194. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 195. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports 
_and_Sourcebooks/2010/Stats_MOE.pdf.  Conversely, one may argue that the new 
policy does not mark the obfuscation of the justification for fast-track departures 
given the seemingly indiscriminate authorization of fast-track programs before this 
change.  See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
 198. See United States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 230 (1st Cir. 2008) (“While 
the decision to institute a fast-track program in a particular judicial district is the At-
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the ambit of the courts that have traditionally been the ones equipped to tailor 
a sentence for a particular defendant, especially given the recent emphasis on 
judicial discretion under section 3553(a) in Supreme Court of the United 
States jurisprudence.199  Under this approach, the district judges in non-fast-
track districts could grant a departure only to those defendants who warrant 
one based a holistic review of section 3553(a) factors, thereby preventing a 
blanket reduction in sentences as is authorized under the new administrative 
policy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The limited authorization of fast-track programs left many defendants 
without a fast-track option complaining of an unwarranted sentencing dispar-
ity.200  District court judges had to decide whether they could grant a non-
fast-tracked defendant a sentence below the Guidelines to mitigate this dis-
parity.  While the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits held such mitigation is 
not required, the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits all held that 
it is error for a district judge not to consider this unwarranted disparity when 
sentencing.201  Rather than allowing the judges in fast-track districts to grant 
departures at their own discretion, the DOJ issued a new policy that would 
also allow any illegal alien charged under 8 U.S.C. section 1326 to be fast-
tracked under prosecutorial discretion.202  While this is consistent with one 
goal of federal sentencing legislations, namely, to eliminate unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities,203 it conflicts with a more recent attempt by Congress to 
reduce the overall number of Guidelines departures.  Further, it eliminates the 
justification of granting these fast-track departures based on a need to prose-
cute immigration cases in overwhelmed districts.  Rather than authorizing a 
blanket reduction in sentences by allowing defendants in any district to re-
ceive departures, sentencing judges should exercise their discretion and only 
grant the departures where they are truly warranted.  
 
  
torney General’s, the ultimate authority to grant a fast-track departure lies with the 
sentencing court.”). 
 199. See supra Part II.B. 
 200. See supra Part II.D. 
 201. See supra Parts II.D, III.A. 
 202. See supra Part III.B. 
 203. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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